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Abstract. This paper presents a theorem on existence of Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games. 
Recently, much attention has focused on problems with vector payoffs in the field of game 
theory [l-3], since multicriteria models can better apply to real-world situations. In this paper, we 
use the generalized fixed-point theorem of Kakutani to derive a sufficient condition for existence 
of a Pareto equilibrium in multicriteria games. 
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The game problem we consider in this paper can be modelled as follows: 
N players play noncooperatively, 
player i has the strategy set Xi and all the feasible outcomes are X = Xr x X2 x . . . x XN, 
For any outcome I E X, player i receives a vector of payoffs (f:(z), . . , , fli(z)), 
Each player attempts to minimize all his payoff functions over X, 
where N 2 2, Xi is a nonempty subset of normed linear space .Si with I( . /Ii and fi : X -+ R1 
is continuous on the subset X of the normed space S = Si x Sz x .. . x SN with the norm 
II4 = CCL II4 > N ‘IN In this paper, we assume that there exists at least some Li 2 2 and 
denote the above game by (N, X ; F”,Xi), where F’ = (fi, . . . , f;.,). 
First we introduce the concept of a Pareto equilibrium for (N, X ; F’, Xi). 
DEFINITION 1. Z E X is called a Pareto equilibrium for the game (N, X ; F’, Xi), if for i = 
1 ,.‘., N, there exists no xi E Xi such that 
$(z?, . . . ,Tiil,zi,tid+l,. . . ,P) 5 $(z’, . . . ,ti-l,+,ti+l,. . . ,zN), 
j= l,... , ki and the above inequality holds strictly for at least one j. 
Let +,Y E X and IV’ E Tt’, = {W E R”l~j > 0,j = l,...,ki and Ethlwj = l}, i = 
1 ! . . . , N. Define 
Sw(x, y) = &Vi)T F’(x’, . . . ,&‘, yi, zi+l, . . . ,zN) 
i=l 
and 
MW(x) = {y’ E x I S”(x, y‘) = zli SW@, y)}, 
where T denotes the inner product operator. Obviously, S w is well defined on X x X and 
MW: x+2x. 
Our main result is the following theorem. 
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THEOREM 1. Suppose that each Xi is compact and convex. If there are W’ E T$, i = 1, . . . , N, 
such that function Sw(z, .) is quasiconvex on X for any fixed c E X, then game (N,X ; F’,X’) 
has at least one Pareto equilibrium. 
PROOF. First we prove that any fixed point of the mapping M w is a Pareto equilibrium for the 
game (N,X; F’,Xi). 
Suppose that Z? E X is a fixed point of MW, i.e., f E MW(f). From the definition of MW, 
SW (T,T) < SW@ y) , ? vy E x. (1) 
It can be verified that the above inequality is equivalent to the following system of inequalities 
(Wi)T F’(f’, . . . ,+l,?+++l,. . . ,TN) < (Wi)T F’@‘, . . . ,3?-1, yir$+‘, . . . ,zN), 
Y’EXj, i=l,..., N. (2) 
If i was not a Pareto equilibrium for the game (N, X ; F’, Xi), then there would exist an ic and 
ijiO E Xi,, such that 
(3) 
and at least one of the above inequalities holds strictly. Observing that W’O E h$I;, we conclude 
(wi0)T F”o($, . . . ,~io-l,~i0,$0+1,. . . ,zN) < (W”o)T F”o(zl, . . . ,7j0-l,~i0,$0+l,f.. ,zN). 
(4) 
This contradicts expression (2). Hence, Z is a pareto equilibrium for the game (N, X ; F’, Xi). 
Next let E E X be fixed. We will show that Mw( ) x is a compact convex nonempty subset 
of s. 
Since the function SW(t, .) is continuous on the nonempty compact subset X, it must reach 
minimal at some point yz E X, i.e., 
Sw(z,yC) = min{Sw(x,y) 1 y E X}. (5) 
Hence, Mw(z) is nonempty. Noting the compactness of set X and the continuity of Sw(z, e), 
we immediately obtain the compactness of the subset Mw(z). 
Now let jj and fi be any two elements of Mw(z) and cr E (0,l). Because of the quasiconvexity 
of function SW (z, e), we have 
Sw(z,05+(l - o)C> 5 max{SW(t,B),SW(~,Ij)} 
= min{Sw(z,y) I y E X}, (6) 
which implies the convexity of M w (x). So for any fixed I E X, M w (z) is nonempty, compact 
and convex. 
Thirdly, we prove the mapping Mw(.) is upper semicontinuous on X. We give a proof by 
contradiction. Assume that MW (.) was not upper semicontinuous on X. There would exist an 
x’ E X, a sequence {XL} C X and a sequence {yk} C X satisfying 
1. Xk + x’; 
2. yh E MW(zck), Vk; 
3. yk + y’, where y’ E X; 
4. y’ 4 MW(x’). 
By the definition of Mw(x’), y’ $2 Mw(x’) im pl ies that we can find a positive number p and a 
point y” E X such that 
SW(x’, y’) - SW@‘, y”) > p. (7) 
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However, since yk E MW(zk) for each k, we have 
sw(zk,?/) 1 SW(Zk,?/E), vk* 
Letting k -+ 03 and using the continuity of function Sw(., a), we obtain 
(8) 
SW@‘, y”) 2 SW@‘, y’), (9) 
a contradiction of inequality (7). Therefore, the mapping Mw(.) is upper semicontinuous on X. 
Thus, Mw(.) is a K-mapping on X [4]. According to [4, Theorem 9.2.21, mapping Mw(.) 
has at least one fixed point. In turn, game (N, X ; F’, Xi) has at least one Pareto equilibrium. 
This completes the proof. 
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